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11 INTRODUCTION
If wealth begets wealth, dynasties may endure even in otherwise meritocratic societies. And if an
indicator of past wealth begets wealth, this too will reinforce the persistence of economic standing
across generations. Such indicators typically bestow prestige and contribute to high status.
Nobility, a culturally determined (i.e., non-genetic) hereditary status marker, might act as such
an indicator, and thereby serve as a vehicle for the cultural transmission of economic standing.
A wide range of channels besides the traditional economic variables have previously been found
to be incorporated in the intergenerational transmission of economic standing. For example,
heritability of physical traits such as cognitive ability and health, and physical appearances such
as height, attractiveness, and race, have all been found to a⁄ect economic outcomes (Bowles and
Gintis 2002). While cultural transmission of economic standing clearly also plays a part, this
vehicle has so far remained relatively unexplored.
Nobility as an institution is an anachronism: it is a traditional term for the highest social
class in some pre-modern societies. Status, however, plays an important role in most societies
and in most times, making individuals allocate valuable resources to status-enhancing activities.
This suggests that even though nobility no longer entails formal privileges, it may continue to
be coveted as a status marker.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that nobility has retained its allure in the modern age. John
von Neumann, the mathematician who pioneered the expected utility framework and laid the
foundations of modern game theory, was the son of Max Neumann, who in 1913 purchased a
claim to Austrian nobility. Max Neumann thereby acquired the right for his o⁄spring (but not
for himself) to call themselves von Neumann, a right of which his son John made good use.1
Another example is German industrialist Heinrich Thyssen, who married the Hungarian baroness
Margit Bornemisza in 1906. Thyssen, a commoner, had his father-in-law adopt him, and since
the Baron had no male heirs, Emperor Franz Joseph I bestowed on Thyssen and his descendants
the right to adopt the Bornemisza name, coat of arms, and title of Baron. More recently, a
scandal erupted in the UK in 2006 following indications of a correlation between individuals
making large loans on favorable terms to the Labour party, and subsequent nominations for
peerage.2
We examine the relative performance of nobility in the marriage market. In doing so, we seek
to fuse research on status with research on mating patterns. Our enquiry rests on two implicit
assumptions: (1) nobility bestows status on the beholder; and (2) individuals get utility from
status, either directly or indirectly. Nobility is typically not traded in open markets, making
it di¢ cult to observe its price. We argue that the marriage market might serve as an informal
conduit for such transactions. If nobility is a vehicle for the intergenerational transmission of
economic standing, the marriage market is the mechanism for this transmission. If such indirect
trade occurs, we ought to be able to observe the valuation of nobility in this market.
1By contrast, von Neumann￿ s contemporary Friedrich von Hayek was bona ￿de nobility but preferred to omit
the von and simply call himself Friedrich Hayek.
2These peerages are not hereditary.
2The Swedish marriage market provides us with an opportunity to estimate the valuation
of nobility as a status asset. In Sweden, nobility as an institution originates from the Alsn￿
Rules of 1280, which granted landowners exemption from taxation in exchange for supplying the
monarch with cavalry troops (vassalage). During the Middle Ages, the link between vassalage
and membership of the nobility became weaker. Increasingly, noble titles came to be handed out
at the monarch￿ s discretion, and it is these titles that have come to constitute the institution of
nobility in its present form. The vast majority of nobility were created in the period 1611-1718,
a period of more or less continuous warfare. The last time Sweden entered into war was 1814.
In the ensuing peacetime, the creation of nobility declined rapidly During the 19th century, the
monarch￿ s right to hand out noble titles was increasingly questioned. The nobility lost most of
their formal privileges in the reform of 1809, and their political in￿ uence was greatly reduced
through the reform of 1866, in which the House of Nobility was stripped of its role as upper
chamber of Parliament. In 1975, the monarch￿ s right to hand out noble titles was formally
revoked.3 Today, Swedish nobility enjoy no formal privileges. The power of the king to ennoble
was abolished in 1975, and Swedish law does not permit transferring ownership of a claim to
nobility in an open market. Marriage is the only remaining conduit for those seeking to join the
nobility. In sum, nobility is an asset that conveys no material privilege and cannot be traded in
an open market.
An old Swedish custom enables us to identify members of the nobility in our marriage data.
Beginning in the mid-16th century, it became customary for newly created nobility to take a
new, distinct name upon becoming part of the nobility, often using a familiar set of pre￿xes
and su¢ xes.4 Moreover, Swedish law awards intellectual property rights to surnames in direct
relation to how distinct they are, i.e., in inverse proportion to the number of families sharing
the name. As a consequence, noble names enjoy particularly strong protection and are easily
identi￿able. The House of Nobility in Stockholm publishes an annual directory of the members of
the approximately 600 remaining noble families. Combining the records of the House of Nobility
with the Total Population Register compiled by Statistics Sweden enabled us to generate a unique
data set, consisting of repeated cross-sections of all marriages in Sweden in 1985, 1990, 1995,
2000 and 2004. In addition to information about the age, education, income and wealth of both
spouses, the data also contains an indicator showing if an individual￿ s surname denotes nobility.
Our data set provides an opportunity to examine whether people are willing to trade wealth
for status, by testing the hypothesis that the probability of hypergamy (marrying ￿up￿ ) in
terms of wealth increases when an individual belongs to the nobility. If nobility bestows status,
and if individuals value both status and material consumption, we would expect an individual
belonging to the nobility to attain a premium in the marriage market compared to a non-noble
individual with otherwise identical characteristics. Such mating patterns would be consistent
3At that point, this right had not been exercised in a long time: the last individual to join the ranks of nobility
was the explorer Sven Hedin, in 1902.
4A few noble families bear common names (i.e., names that are not distinct). If there are individuals in
our data set that have mistakenly been identi￿ed as nobility, this might result in a slight downward bias in our
estimates.
3with complementarities between wealth and status. In addition, Swedish nobility is hereditary
on the male side only.
We also test the auxiliary hypothesis that male nobility is valued more than female nobility.
To the extent that individuals care about their o⁄spring, they will attach greater value to a
status marker if it can be passed on to their children. Conditional on a continued male lineage,
noble status can be thought of as an asset that continues to pay dividends inde￿nitely. Even
with intergenerational discounting, we would expect such an asset to attain a higher price than
the non-hereditary equivalent, which can be thought of as an asset paying a dividend only in the
current period.
Our main ￿nding is a signi￿cant increase in the probability of hypergamy in wealth for mem-
bers of the nobility, controlling for own wealth and other covariates. This ￿nobility premium￿is
sizeable. The wealth distribution in our data is heavily concentrated in the lowest wealth bracket,
resulting in a low baseline probability of marrying up. Given this, the observed nobility premium
must be considered large, increasing the probability of marrying up by about 40 percent. The
e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant and robust to a number of di⁄erent measures of hypergamy.
We ￿nd less support for the auxiliary hypothesis that male nobility attain a higher premium
than female nobility. The interaction term for male sex and nobility has the expected (positive)
sign, but is not statistically signi￿cant. In other words, we are unable to reject the hypothesis
that the premium is of equal magnitude for male and female nobility.
In sum, our main ￿nding is consistent with the hypothesis that nobility attain a premium
on the marriage market, indicating that mate preferences are status sensitive. Our results are
highly robust to di⁄erent de￿nitions of hypergamy. This suggests that the cultural transmission
of economic standing, channeled through nobility and other status markers, should be taken into
account in an analysis of the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline some relevant existing research
on status and marriage. In section 3, we describe our marriage data. In section 4 we present
our econometric model and report the regression estimates based on the marriage data. We also
summarize our robustness checks. We conclude in section 5, where we discuss some implications
of our results and suggest directions for future research.
2 RELEVANT LITERATURE
Our analysis draws on two strands of economic research: on the one hand, literature looking at
the role of status in the economy, and on the other hand, economic analysis of the ￿marriage
market￿ , i.e., the matching of brides and grooms. In this section we outline some of the more
relevant literature in these areas.
42.1 Status
That the concern for relative position plays an important role in social interactions is by no
means a recent insight in economics. Adam Smith devoted a considerable part of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments to a discussion about the link between wealth and social esteem (Smith 2000,
see in particular chapters 2 and 3). Veblen (1899, pp. 25-26) famously argued that the pursuit
of relative position is the main driving force of (conspicuous) material consumption:
The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same motive of
emulation continues active in the further development of the institution to which it has
given rise and in the development of all those features of the social structure which this
institution of ownership touches. The possession of wealth confers honour; it is an invidious
distinction.
This raises the question of whether relative position is pursued as an end in itself. Frank
(1999) argues that humans may well be hardwired to seek grati￿cation from moving up in the
social hierarchy. He points to research showing that relative position is correlated with serotonin
levels in non-human primates (McGuire, Raleigh and Brammer 1982, Raleigh and McGuire
1994).
If individuals derive utility from status in itself, independently of material bene￿ts associated
with it, a utility function that incorporates relative position as one of its arguments might do
a better job of explaining individual choices (see, e.g., Frank 1985). The idea of status in the
utility function has recently been picked up by Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005, p. 283),
who note that ￿[w]hen status is important, individuals would be willing to pay a lot in time,
e⁄ort, and money for su¢ ciently high status.￿Utility derived from relative position in itself has
also been analyzed in theoretical work on incentives (see, e.g., Moldovanu, Sela and Shi 2007).
A related strand of research takes identity (of which status may be an important determinant)
as an argument of the utility function (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
To the extent that other individuals attach a value to relative position, status markers may
have economic value even to individuals who do not care about relative position in itself. In a
laboratory experiment, Ball et al. (2001) ￿nd that economic outcomes are a⁄ected by the status
of participants in a market. Individuals who were assigned high status attained higher prices
as sellers, and lower prices as buyers, than individuals who had been assigned low status. This
e⁄ect prevailed even when the assignment of status was entirely random, and the randomization
process was common knowledge. Such behavioral patterns would allow individuals to reap direct
economic bene￿ts from status markers. Hence they may covet these without necessarily getting
any utility from the status marker in itself. We return to this important quali￿er in section 2.3.
2.2 The marriage market
We hypothesize that individuals with wealth but no status are likely to be matched in marriage
with individuals with status but less wealth. Such a mating pattern is assortative, in the sense
5that individuals are sorted non-randomly into matched pairs on the basis of observable charac-
teristics. Most animals engage in non-random mating. The most commonly observed pattern
is positive assortative mating, meaning that a member of a species is matched with another
member of that species who is similar with regard to a certain trait. Compared to less strati￿ed
mating patterns, positive assortative mating reinforces di⁄erences in the endowments of biolog-
ical, economic and cultural assets in the population over time (FernÆndez and Rogerson 2001;
FernÆndez, Guner and Rogerson 2005). Under certain assumptions, such mating patterns can
preserve heterogeneity in a population inde￿nitely (Bisin and Verdier 2000).
The seminal microeconomic model of assortative mating in the marriage market is Becker
(1973, see also Becker 1991). This model, originally introduced by Koopmans and Beckmann
(1957) to describe the assignment of plants to ￿rms, generates a pairwise assignment of elements
of one set to elements of another set. The elements of a set di⁄er in a single trait. In Koopmans
and Beckmann (1957), an optimal sorting is de￿ned as a sorting that is in the core, in the sense
that there is no other coalition outside the core in which both parties could be made better o⁄by
an alternative sorting. A key result in this model is that such a sorting necessarily produces the
greatest aggregate output (summing across all matches), though it does not necessarily include
the largest output element (the matching with the largest output).
Becker￿ s adaptation of the Koopmans and Beckmann model to the marriage market hinges
on his characterization of marriage as an economic institution. Central to his analysis is the
idea of a marriage production function, which takes the endowments (in a wide sense) of both
spouses as its inputs, and produces a joint output that is consumed by the household. This joint
output consists of pecuniary rewards from the labor market, non-pecuniary production taking
place at home, and leisure. The model is unitary, in the sense that the household is assumed
to maximize this output according to a single utility function, which does not require explicit
modelling of the bargaining for resources within the household.
In Becker￿ s (1973) model, individuals di⁄er in a single trait, common to both men and
women, and a marital output function that is increasing in this trait. The model predicts
positive assortative mating in this trait if an increase in the trait for both partners has an
e⁄ect on marital output that is greater than the sum of the partial e⁄ects of increasing one
while holding the other constant. In other words, increasing the trait in one partner raises the
marginal e⁄ect of the other partner￿ s endowment of the trait on marital output. In economic
terms, there is complementarity between the two partners￿endowments of the trait. In the
presence of such complementarity, it can be shown that positive assortative mating produces the
greatest aggregate output over all marriages.5
Positive assortative mating has been reported in a variety of traits, for both humans and
animals. Almenberg and Dreber (2008) show that Swedish marriage data indicate positive as-
sortative mating within both status and wealth.6 In the case of mixed matches between wealthy
5A proof is given in the mathematical appendix of Becker (1991, page 130). Note that the model is frictionless,
in the sense that the optimal matching is assumed to come about of itself, without any reference to how the process
of sorting actually takes place.
6There is a large literature on positive assortative mating as well as mate preferences in general. See, for
6individuals and individuals with high status, however, the assortative mating is between traits
rather than within a trait: individuals with high wealth but low status sorting with individuals
with low wealth but high status. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous em-
pirical economic examinations of assortative mating between status and wealth in the marriage
market.
2.3 Status and marriage
Economic theory blending the themes of status and marriage is scarce; these areas have typically
been examined separately. A notable exception is Mailath and Postlewaite (2006, henceforth
M&P), who introduce the notion of a ￿social asset￿ , being an asset that derives some or all of
its value from social institutions. They distinguish between the fundamental and intrinsic values
of an asset. A status marker that has no fundamental value may still have intrinsic value if it
raises expected future income.
While typically non-transferable within a generation, M&P suggest that certain hereditary
traits might have such instrumental value because parents typically care not only about their
own consumption but also the consumption of their o⁄spring: while hereditary traits cannot be
traded contemporaneously, individuals who don￿ t possess the trait can mate with individuals
who do, in the hope that their o⁄spring will inherit it.
The value of hereditary social assets may in part be due to the di¢ culty of insuring future
generations against consumption risk: while any generation may squander a family￿ s economic
resources, the subsequent generations can still be endowed with a single asset that cannot be
relinquished, and yet raises their expected consumption ￿namely, a trait that bestows status.
In other words, each generation of a lineage can extract the ￿ ow value of the asset, but cannot
extract the capitalized present value of future ￿ ows.
The valuation of such social assets may be self-ful￿lling. If everybody else attaches value to
an asset, it may become covetable also for individuals to whom it has no intrinsic value. Agents
in the M&P model di⁄er in terms of income (which is either high or low) and a binary trait.
Income is assumed to be non-storable, so that parents cannot transfer consumption to their
o⁄spring. If individuals in possession of the trait are ceteris paribus more desirable partners,
they will have a greater chance of marrying ￿up￿in wealth. In this case, acquiring the trait
through marriage becomes a means for the parents to insure against some of the consumption
risk of their o⁄spring. In other words, the best response of an individual in a society where
others seek to marry individuals with the coveted trait may be to also seek to marry individuals
with that trait, thereby raising the chances of their o⁄spring having the trait and thereby higher
expected income. Hence, in equilibrium the desirability of the trait can self-ful￿lling.7
The particular characteristics of the attribute are irrelevant: ￿Any heritable attribute might
example, the references in Almenberg and Dreber (2008).
7The o⁄spring have higher expected income for two reasons: income may be correlated with the trait, and
possession of the trait raises the likelihood of marrying a high income individual who in turns wants to insure the
consumption risk of his/her o⁄spring. The ￿rst mechanism is not a necessary requirement.
7serve as a social asset in this way￿(Mailath and Postlewaite 2006, p. 1059). Although M&P
do not mention hereditary nobility, this institution ￿ts the prescribed mechanism well. It is
widely accepted that broad measures of ability such as IQ are mean-reverting. Noble titles were
typically awarded in reward for distinguished service to the monarch. Such services often also
resulted in pecuniary rewards, such as land grants. Family fortunes, however, can be lost in the
course of a single generation, whereas hereditary nobility is inalienable: it cannot be sold since
it cannot be transferred. For an individual with high ability and high income, nobility may have
o⁄ered a means to insure against lower ability in a subsequent generation, and the associated
risk of an inferior economic outcome for the individual￿ s o⁄spring.
3 MARRIAGE DATA
To shed more light on the role of nobility in marriage markets, we use a repeated cross-section
of all marriages in Sweden during 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004, in total 195,405 marriages.8
We are interested in the individual probability of marrying up in wealth, hence each spouse is
treated as a separate observation, giving us a sample of 380,810 observations. The data are
drawn from the Total Population Register, contain every registered marriage during the years in
question, and were compiled by Statistics Sweden on our behalf. The data contain information
on a number of characteristics of bride and groom, including age, income, net wealth and level
of education, all measured at the time of marriage. The data set also contains a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if an individual￿ s surname denotes nobility, and 0 otherwise. A set of
names belonging to the remaining families of the nobility was provided by the House of Nobility
in Stockholm and used to generate this indicator. In the data set, 1,782 individuals belong to
the nobility according to this indicator, equivalent to a bit less than 0.5 percent of the sample.9
The control variables are de￿ned in terms of brackets. In part this re￿ ects the require-
ment from Statistics Sweden to protect individual integrity, given the small number of nobil-
ity in our sample. There are ￿ve (annual) income categories: [0￿121,999], [122,000￿199,999],
[200,000￿299,999], [300,000￿499,999], and [500,000￿].10 Age is in the following brackets: (￿24],
[25￿29], [30￿34], [35￿39], [40￿44], [45￿54], or [55￿). The data on education places each individ-
ual in one of four categories, corresponding to pre-high school, high school, less than three years
of tertiary education, and more than three years of tertiary education. Individual wealth belongs
to one of four categories: [0￿199,999], [200,000￿499,999], [500,000￿1,499,999], and [1,500,000￿].
There is a high concentration of individuals in the lowest wealth bracket. Summary statistics
for the entire sample are reported in Table A.1 in the appendix, and for nobility in Table A 2.
8At the time of writing, the data for 2005 was not yet available, so we chose the closest available data.
9This is slightly larger than the proportion of nobility in the general population (about 0.3%). This could
be caused by nobility having an above average propensity to marry. Bearing this in mind, we can only make
inferences regarding the individuals that actually marry. It could also be caused by sampling error, due to some
noble names not being distinct. In this case our estimates will be biased downward, thus underestimating the
actual nobility premium.
10All amounts reported are nominal and measured in SEK. 1 SEK = approx. 0.1 USD, adjusted for purchasing
power.
8For each of these covariates, we construct a set of dummy variables corresponding to the afore-
mentioned categories. In the regressions, the lowest bracket is the baseline for each categorical
variable.
The wealth tax that was e⁄ective in Sweden until 2007 provided strong incentives for tax
avoidance. Assets not taxed at all or entered in tax returns at levels below market value included
real estate, land holdings, art and antiques, and shares of small-cap ￿rms on the Stockholm stock
exchange (not on the A-list). Given that there have been numerous ways of reducing taxable
wealth in Sweden, it is unlikely that these ￿gures show the individuals￿full wealth. This reduces
the e¢ ciency of our estimator. In addition, it is a potential source of unobserved heterogeneity
in the sample. Let W be the true wealth, and (1￿￿)W the observed wealth of individual i, with
0 < ￿ < 1. If ￿ is positively correlated with belonging to the nobility, our estimate of the nobility
premium will be biased upwards. This could make what might in fact be positive assortative
mating look like hypergamy. Note that even if ￿ is correlated with nobility, our estimates of the
di⁄erence in the nobility coe¢ cient between male and female nobility will not be biased unless the
correlation itself di⁄ers systematically between the sexes. We discuss unobserved heterogeneity
more extensively in the next section.
4 HYPOTHESIS TESTING
4.1 From marrying ￿in￿ to marrying ￿up￿
Traditionally, nobility were expected to marry within their own ranks. The marriage market
data suggests that this is changing. Endogamy (within-group marriage) still occurs: the odds
of a spouse belonging to the nobility are more than twice as high if an individual also belongs
to the nobility (logit regression, ￿nobility: 1:20; p-value < 0:001). The coe¢ cient on the nobility
dummy is large compared to the coe¢ cients on age, income or wealth (see Table A.3. in the
Appendix for a full table of the regression results). Yet, the tradition of endogamous marriage
seems to be coming to an end. The great majority (98%) of the nobility in our sample are
not married to other nobility, and the number of marriages in which both spouses belong to
the nobility declines monotonically over time. Figure 1, below, shows the actual number of
endogamous marriages among Swedish nobility observed in our sample, by year. This is plotted
against the potential number of such marriages, de￿ned (somewhat arbitrarily) as the minimum
of male/female nobility getting married in that year. The third series shows the expected number
of such marriages, if nobility were randomly assigned to males and females in our sample. There
are two salient features of Figure 1. First, the frequency of endogamous marriage has been
steadily declining, despite a more or less constant number of nobility in the marriage market.
Second, the rate of endogamous marriage has been converging toward, and recently reached, the
level that we would expect to observe with random matching.
9Figure 1.
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In other words, endogamous marriage within the nobility, once considered the norm, has
become an unusual occurrence.11 For the most recent observations in our data, such marriages
occur at a rate no greater than what we would observe under random matching. One inter-
pretation of this pattern is that nobility, in response to modernizing reforms that curtail their
economic in￿ uence, turn to exogamy as a dominant strategy for securing access to resources.
This process may have gone on for some time: for example, strategic marriages between British
nobility, rich in symbolic capital but cash poor, with the daughters of American industrialists
in the late 19th and early 20th century have been documented by historians (see, for example,
Cannadine, 1990). In Sweden, the waning in￿ uence of the nobility in the 20th century was
re￿ ected in a marked decline in their statistical overrepresentation on company boards, in the
foreign service, and other prestigeous positions (Rundblad 1999). In 1968, individuals belonging
to the nobility constituted 12 percent of all board members of the 50 largest companies on the
Stockholm stock exchange. By 1998, this had declined to 4 percent.12 In the foreign service,
nobility constituted 26 percent of all ambassadors and consul generals in 1968. This had declined
to 8 percent by 1998 (Rundblad 1999). When the formal privileges of nobility were curtailed,
marrying up in wealth may have gained importance as a means of securing access to material
resources.
4.2 Regression analysis: is there a nobility premium?
Having noted that nobility are not marrying within their group to any great extent, we now turn
our attention to whether they are marrying up in wealth. According to our hypothesis, wealthy
individuals will covet status markers in general and hereditary, inalienable status marker in
particular, resulting in a higher probability of marrying up in wealth for individuals belonging
to the nobility. To test this hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable that takes on the
11By contrast, Banerjee et al. (2008) report that within-caste marriage is still prevalent in India.
12As measured by turnover (Rundblad 1999).
10value 1 if individual i marries into a higher wealth bracket, and 0 otherwise. To examine the
robustness of our results, we test a number of di⁄erent speci￿cations of this indicator, including
the transition probabilities between speci￿c wealth brackets. Our results are broadly robust to
such modi￿cations.
We use the logistic binary response model (logit regression) to estimate the probability of an
individual marrying a spouse in a higher wealth bracket. The logistic functional form generates
estimates that are bounded on the unit interval, and hence has an intuitive appeal when the
dependent variable is a binary outcome.
We regress a dummy variable that indicates marrying up on an individuals age, education,
income, wealth, and sex, as well as whether the individual belongs to the nobility.13 We have
no reason to believe that the parameters of the true model are the same for men and women.
For this reason, we run separate regression for women and men. Since we are also interested
in how the nobility coe¢ cient di⁄ers between the sexes, we also run a joint regression where
we allow all coe¢ cients to di⁄er between the sexes. We include a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is male, allowing for di⁄erent baseline probabilities for men and women,
and interaction terms between the male dummy and the controls, including the nobility dummy,
thus allowing for the slope coe¢ cients to di⁄er between the sexes.
The joint regression o⁄ers a statistical measure of how the nobility coe¢ cient di⁄ers between
the sexes. A Wald test rejects that these interaction terms are jointly insigni￿cant (p-value
< 0:0001). In each regression, we also include a full set of controls for the spouse, to make sure
that we are not confounding an increased probability of marrying up in wealth with an increased
probability of marrying somebody with higher age, income or education. Note that in order to
run a joint regression, we rearrange the observations so that each individual appears twice, once
as individual i and once as a spouse. This allows us to estimate the probability on the whole
population of individuals in the sample. For the regression on the joint sample, where we allow
the coe¢ cients to di⁄er between the sexes, we can write our regression speci￿cation as a logistic
probability model of the form





where P(Yij = 1jXij) denotes the probability of marrying up for an individual i of sex j,
conditional on the covariates. Nobility is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if individual
i belongs to the nobility, and Xi is the vector of controls mentioned above. The subscript j
denotes gender. Table 1 summarizes the results from the regressions, for both sexes separately
(columns 1 and 2), and for the joint sample (column 3).
13Since individuals in the highest wealth bracket cannot marry up, we exclude these observations from the
analysis. In our main regression, we do not control for the spouse belonging to the nobility. Our results are
robust to the inclusion of this control. They are also robust to omitting all spouse controls.
11Table 1
Dependent Variable: Marrying ￿Up￿in Wealth.
Women Men All
(1) (2) (3)




Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interaction terms (*male) No No Yes
Male -0.473
(0.000)***
Constant -5.129 -5.517 -4.919
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***





Robust standard errors. p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The coe¢ cient for nobility is positive and statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. Columns
1 and 2 show that both male and female nobility have higher probabilities of marrying up in
wealth, when controlling for the available covariates. The coe¢ cient is larger for noble men than
for noble women. Column 3 shows the same thing, but the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿-
cant. We rely on the speci￿cation in column (3) of Table 1 as our main model, and interpret our
results below. A complete table of coe¢ cients for these regressions can be found in Table A.4.
in the Appendix.
The observed nobility premium is sizeable. The wealth distribution in our sample is heavily
concentrated in the lowest bracket. When an individual marries up, his/her spouse by de￿nition
marries down. Hence, the largest potential number of marriages in which one individual marries
up in wealth equals the number of individuals in the second, third and fourth wealth brackets,
about 3.2% of the sample. As a result, marrying up in wealth is a rare event, achieved by only
2.6% of the individuals in our sample. For nobility, however, this frequency is 4.4%. What our
regressions show is that including a number of relevant controls does not diminish this nobility
premium. In the main regression (Table 1, column 3), the estimated nobility premium is an
almost 40 percent increase in the odds of marrying into a higher wealth bracket.
While the interaction term between nobility and being male has the expected (positive) sign
in the logit regression in column 3, it is not statistically signi￿cant. This implies that we cannot
reject that the increase in probability is of the same magnitude for noble men and noble women.
Thus, we do not ￿nd conclusive support for our auxiliary hypothesis of a gender gap in the
nobility premium.14
14We also estimate a linear (OLS) model using the same speci￿cation. With this functional form, the interaction
term between male sex and nobility has the wrong sign, and is still not statistically signi￿cant. Because the R2
12Nobility might be correlated with variables that we are unable to control for in the sample, for
example human and social capital, or even physical appearance. If such unobserved heterogeneity
is a direct consequence of nobility, this does not undermine the validity of our ￿ndings. It is
important to recognize, however, that there might be other unobserved variables that could
arguably a⁄ect our results. This is a further reason for interpreting our results with some caution.
Nobility are slightly over-represented among individuals that marry, implying that there might
be some selection bias. Moreover, if the fraction of an individual￿ s wealth that goes unreported
is positively correlated with belonging to the nobility, then our estimates will be biased upward.
Table A.2.2. in the Appendix shows that nobility are ￿to the right￿of the general sample in
terms of wealth distribution. Nobility may have wealthier parents than other individuals in the
same wealth bracket. An individual marrying a member of the nobility with no wealth could
be expecting future wealth through inheritance. Another possible omitted variable would be
that past wealth is positively correlated with residing in a› uent neighbourhoods, and residing
in a› uent neighbourhoods may be positively correlated with the probability of marrying ￿up￿ .
A more sophisticated modelling approach to the marriage market would add additional com-
plexity to the interpretation of our results. Hypothetically, nobility could be more prevalent in
marriage markets in which population densities, the fraction of singles, and sex ratios among
singles di⁄er from the population average. In a search model of the marriage market, these fac-
tors would be expected to in￿ uence the reservation price at which a match is made (Drewianka
2003). Controlling for such factors is beyond the scope of our data set, but would constitute an
interesting avenue for further research.
While each of these concerns are valid, they a⁄ect only the interpretation of our ￿ndings,
and not their implications. Regardless of whether nobility marry up in wealth because their
nobility is a covetable status marker or because they live in a› uent neighborhoods etc., the
consequence of this hypergamy is that economic resources are channeled toward nobility at a
time when they have relinquished all other economic and political privileges. To the extent that
access to resources is linked to reproductive success, this may have considerable implications for
the longevity of nobility as an institution and for the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
4.3 Robustness checks
We conduct a number of robustness checks to test the validity of our results. Our conclusion,
based on these checks, is that our results are robust. A non-technical summary of the robustness
checks follows below.
Our ￿rst robustness check consists of examining whether our main ￿nding, the nobility pre-
mium, is consistent with alternative measures of hypergamy. The measure we use for our main
regression, reported in Table 1 above, is the probability of marrying an individual in a higher
wealth category. Let xi , yi denote the wealth bracket of individual i and individual i￿ s spouse.
of the linear model is considerably lower than for the logistic model, we focus mainly on the latter. Estimates for
the linear model are included in Table A.4., in the Appendix.
13Our main model corresponds to estimating the probability of yi > xi, conditional on the co-
variates. To check the robustness of our ￿ndings, we use the same model speci￿cation, except
that we use three other measures of hypergamy: (1) xi = 1, yi ￿ 2;(2) xi ￿ 2, yi > 2; and
(3) xi = 1, yi = 4. We ￿nd evidence of a nobility premium of similar magnitude in all the
aforementioned cases, suggesting that our results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of




Measure of hypergamy Coefficient p-value
xi = 1, yi > 1 0.499   (0.003)***
xi < 3, yi> 2 0.400 (0.077)*
xi = 1, yi = 4 0.862   (0.003)***
p-values in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
*sign. at 10% level; **sign. at 5% level; ***sign. at 1% level
Nobility dummy
A second purpose of these checks is to examine whether our results are driven by di⁄erences
in the distribution of nobility and non-nobility within wealth brackets. The wealth distributions
of the nobility and of the general sample are di⁄erent, with the probability mass of the former
being ￿to the right￿of the latter, in the sense of stochastic ￿rst order dominance. Given the
high level of aggregation ￿only four wealth brackets ￿di⁄erences in the distribution within each
bracket might in￿ uence our results. If, for example, the average wealth of nobility in the lowest
wealth bracket is higher (lower) than average wealth of non-nobility in the same bracket, our
estimate for this group would be biased upward (downward). As an additional precaution, we
also estimate the probability of marrying ￿down￿ . We run a regression similar to the one above,
except that the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual from the
second, third or fourth wealth bracket marries an individual in a lower wealth bracket, xi > yi.
15If nobility in the higher wealth brackets on average have higher wealth than other individuals
within that bracket, then they should be less likely to marry down. We ￿nd no evidence of such
an e⁄ect (nobility dummy p-value < 0:971). We conclude that our results are not likely to be
driven by di⁄erences in the distribution of nobility and non-nobility within wealth brackets.
5 CONCLUSION
We have attempted to fuse the research on status with that on mating patterns, by examining
the relative performance of hereditary nobility, a proxy for status, in the marriage market. In
15Note that this regression is, in practice, not perfectly symmetrical with a regression looking at the probability
of marrying up. The former omits individuals in the lowest wealth bracket, who by de￿nition can￿ t marry down.
The latter omits individuals in the highest wealth bracket, who by de￿nition can￿ t marry up.
14Sweden, nobility no longer enjoy formal privileges, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that nobility
remains coveted. Since nobility is not traded in open markets, we study the marriage market as
a conduit for such transactions.
We ￿nd that nobility enjoy a higher probability of marrying up in wealth. Because our sample
is heavily concentrated in the lowest wealth bracket, we observe few individuals marrying up in
wealth. For the general sample, the rate is 2.6%. For the subsample belonging to the nobility,
however, this rate is 4.4%. We have shown that this apparent nobility premium is robust to
controlling for a number of relevant variables.
The data also indicates a gender di⁄erence, with males, for whom nobility is heriditary,
attaining a higher premium. The gender di⁄erence, however, is not statistically signi￿cant. Taken
together, these two results could be explained in several ways. To suggest a few: (1) There is a
nobility premium, and it is higher for males. The sample contains enough individuals belonging
to the nobility to detect the premium, but not enough to identify the gender di⁄erence. (2) There
is a nobility premium, and it is higher for males. Other gender di⁄erences in mate preferences
obscure the gender di⁄erence in the nobility premium. (3) There is a nobility premium, because
individuals care about their own status, but no gender di⁄erence, because individuals do not
care about their children￿ s status.16 (4) There is no nobility premium. The observed e⁄ect is
driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
Our data does not enable us to discern which, if any, of these alternative explanations is the
correct one. Hypothesis testing on our sample of observational data rejects the null hypothesis
that nobility do not have better chances of marrying up in wealth. The data has clear limitations,
and we are not able to rule out concerns about unobserved heterogeneity ￿ as is always the case
with observational data. We wish to emphasize that the results presented here are a ￿rst step
toward a better understanding of the nobility premium, and we encourage other researchers to
shed more light on this topic. We will conclude by discussing some possible implications of a
nobility premium.
Who marries whom in￿ uences future generations to the extent that the characteristics of the
parents are passed on to their children, through their genes as well as a shared environment.
Who marries whom is therefore an indicator of the distribution of a wide range of characteristics
of successive generations. In a similar manner, the distribution of culturally determined status
markers in the population may have important e⁄ects on economic outcomes.
In an era when their formal privileges have been curtailed, a marriage premium for nobility
suggests a positive valuation of the status marker itself. If the symbolic capital of nobility
continues to attract a premium in the marriage market, this provides an additional mechanism
that reinforces the persistence of social strati￿cation and inequality. Moreover, if status and
consumption of other goods are complementary as Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) suggest,
and if status markets are becoming relatively more scarce, the nobility premium might well be
16This would contradict the assumptions of the model in Mailath and Postlewaite (2006). It would also
contradict the large literature on bequest motives.
15increasing over time.17
If access to material resources is correlated with greater reproductive success, a marriage
market premium would imply that nobility may persist for a long time, even if no new nobility is
created. Historically, male nobility, and rich men in general, have reproduced to a greater extent
than other men (e.g., Clark 2007). This is not surprising given that these men tended to be in
the upper strata of wealth and status, and had privileges held by neither commoners nor noble
women. Wealth and status have both been found to correlate positively with male reproductive
success among other groups, such as 19th Century Mormons (Mealey 1985) and the Ifaluk in
Micronesia (Turke and Betzig 1985).
When nobility is only passed on through male o⁄spring, the perpetuation of nobility requires
a continued male lineage. We merged data in Fahlbeck (1899) with 20th Century records from the
House of Nobility in order to trace the evolution of the stock of noble families over time.18 Note
that the number of families is the observed quantity, and has not been corrected for population
size.19 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the stock of noble families since 1500. The net stock is
the di⁄erence between the cumulative created and the cumulative discontinued.
Figure 2.





























Cum. created Cum. discontinued Net stock
A rapid decline in the creation rate has caused the stock of nobility to decline monotonically
in the last 200 years (i.e., in peacetime). The recent decline is well described by a simple model of
17Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) show how the price of status relative to other consumption goods
increases when status markers become relatively more scarce.
18These records are as yet incomplete: while it is generally known if a male lineage has been discontinued, it is
not always known in which year this happened. In the cases where the decade, but not exact year, was known,
we used the middle year of that decade. In the cases where not even the decade was known, the discontinuation
year was imputed using linear regression. The discontinuation year was imputed using information on year of
creation, monarch at time of creation, and the occupation of the ￿rst member of the noble lineage. Approximately
10 percent of all discontinuation dates were imputed in this manner.
19The analysis is made slightly more complicated by the fact that the dataset includes families that were raised
from the lower ranks of nobility to the higher, titled ranks. This applies to about 20 percent of the sample. The
branch that was elevated to a higher rank is counted in the data as the creation of a new noble family, which
overlooks the fact that it stems from a male lineage that is already noble. Excluding this subset, however, has
negligable e⁄ects on the general picture.
16exponential decline. When ￿tting such a model to this data, we get a predicted half-life of about
100 years for the stock of nobility 20 There are currently almost 600 remaining noble families. If
the stock continues to decline at this rate, there will remain about 300 families by the year 2100,
150 families by the year 2200, and so forth. In sum, nobility as an institution appears to have
considerable longevity, despite no longer enjoying economic or political privileges. If this simple
model above comes close to predicting future developments, we ought to conclude that simply
ceasing to create new noble families is not a very e⁄ective way of terminating the institution of
nobility.21
Hereditary nobility is an anachronism. Our analysis can be extended, however, to other
hereditary status markers which may perpetuate in modern times. For example, many Ivy League
universities have adopted a so called ￿legacy policy￿ , whereby the probability of acceptance is
higher, ceteris paribus, if a parent has attended the same university (Karabel 2005). To the
extent that an Ivy League education is a positional good, alumni status might come to play a
similar role in marriage markets in the future. We encourage future research in this area.
In sum, status a⁄ects economic outcomes, and is positively assorted with wealth in the mar-
riage market. Given the hereditary nature of nobility, this mating pattern has consequences for
the transmission of inequality. Not only does wealth beget wealth in the marriage market, but
an indicator of past wealth does so, too. We end our discussion by noting that the marriage
of wealth and status is an old and familiar theme. Well known representations in popular cul-
ture include Hogarth￿ s Marriage ￿ la Mode, a series of 19th century engravings featuring a cash
poor aristocrat, Lord Squander￿eld, who marries o⁄ his son to the daughter of a merchant. In
di Lampedusa￿ s (1966) novel The Leopard, Don Fabrizio, an ageing Sicilian prince, reluctantly
marries o⁄ his orphaned nephew to the daughter of a local businessman with new-found wealth
but no pedigree. In a revealing episode, Don Fabrizio is told that the prospective bride￿ s grand-
father Peppe was known, un￿ atteringly, as ￿Peppe ￿ Mmerda￿ . The prince is taken aback by this
information, but is determined to press ahead with matters. Non olet, he reminds himself, non
olet.22
20Let S(t) denote the stock of noble families at time t, normalized by population size. From a regression of
log(S) on the time interval since 1900, we get a time coe¢ cient of ￿0:0079 (OLS with robust standard errors, p-
value < 0:001, R-squared 0:986). Entering this estimate into the model of exponential decline we get an expression
for the evolution of the stock of nobility over time:
S(t) = S0e￿0:0079(t￿1900) (2)
21This reasoning assumes no frequency-dependent advantage. If, for example, the marriage market valuation
of nobility is an increasing function of the scarcity of nobility, a frequency-dependent nobility premium might
arise. This would imply far greater longevity for nobility than is predicted by our exponential model. Exploring
the rami￿cations of this more fully would constitute an exciting avenue for future research. It should also be
noted that since no new noble lineages are created, the institution is likely to eventually cease to exist, although
this might take a very long time. In stochastic models of population dynamics, lineages are typically either
eliminated or go to ￿xation (so that the entire population stems from the same lineage). In the case of nobility,
both outcomes would make the institution redundant.
22(Latin) Pecunia non olet: money does not smell.
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19Appendix
Table A.1. Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample
A.1.1. Age Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Age
￿25 25￿29 30￿34 35￿39 40￿44 45￿54 55￿
Men 9:4 27:6 25:4 14:9 8:4 9:4 4:8
Women 19:6 31:2 21:0 11:5 6:7 7:4 2:6
All 14:6 29:4 23:2 13:2 7:6 8:4 3:7
A.1.2. Education Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Education
< High school High school < 3 years tertiary > 3 years tertiary
Men 18:2 49:4 14:8 17:5
Women 16:1 49:6 16:4 18:0
All 17:1 49:5 15:6 17:8
A.1.3. Income Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Income
[￿121;999] [122;000￿ [200;000￿ [300;000￿ [500;000￿]
199;999] 299;999] 499;999]
Men 27:9 28:0 26:9 13:8 3:3
Women 49:2 31:0 15:0 4:2 0:6
All 38:9 29:6 20:8 8:9 1:9
A.1.4. Wealth Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Wealth
[￿200;000] [200;000￿ [500;000￿ [1;500;000￿]
499;999] 1;499;999]
Men 96:1 2:1 1:1 0:8
Women 97:5 1:6 0:5 0:3
All 96:8 1:9 0:8 0:5
20Table A.2. Summary Statistics for Nobility Only
A.2.1. Age Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Age
￿25 25￿29 30￿34 35￿39 40￿44 45￿54 55￿
Men 5:9 26:5 26:9 16:0 7:7 11:0 6:1
Women 11:2 33:4 23:9 10:4 8:8 8:6 3:7
All 8:4 29:7 25:5 13:4 8:2 9:9 4:9
A.2.2. Education Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Education
< High school High school < 3 years tertiary > 3 years tertiary
Men 11:5 40:0 17:0 31:5
Women 10:7 41:2 19:5 28:6
All 11:1 40:6 18:2 30:1
A.2.3. Income Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Income
[￿121;999] [122;000￿ [200;000￿ [300;000￿ [500;000￿]
199;999] 299;999] 499;999]
Men 23:8 25:0 27:2 19:0 5:0
Women 42:2 29:3 19:9 7:5 1:1
All 32:6 27:1 23:7 13:5 3:1
A.2.4. Wealth Distribution by Gender, in Percent.
Wealth
[￿200;000] [200;000￿ [500;000￿ [1;500;000￿]
499;999] 1;499;999]
Men 87:7 4:6 3:1 4:6
Women 92:3 2:7 3:0 2:0
All 89:9 3:7 3:0 3:4




















< 3 years tertiary 0.255
(0.011)**
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< 3 years tertiary 0.457
(0.000)***
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Robust standard errors. p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
24Table A.4. Dependent Variable: Marrying ￿Up￿in Wealth.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men All All
Nobility 0.39 0.434 0.382 0.018




25-29 0.14 0.51 0.211 0.003
(0.016)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)***
30-34 0.188 0.597 0.303 0.005
(0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
35-39 0.184 0.592 0.347 0.005
(0.011)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.008)***
40-44 0.158 0.658 0.349 0.004
(0.049)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.125)
45-54 0.151 0.612 0.367 -0.003
(0.071)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.31)
55- 0.396 0.861 0.632 0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.664)
Education
High school 0.239 0.118 0.212 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.026)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
< 3 years tertiary 0.499 0.268 0.455 0.014
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
> 3 years tertiary 0.575 0.309 0.527 0.018
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Income
[122,000-199,999] -0.123 0.314 -0.13 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.303)
[200,000-299,999] -0.265 0.621 -0.284 -0.009
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
[300,000-499,999] -0.158 0.729 -0.185 -0.011
(0.043)** (0.000)*** (0.017)** (0.000)***
[500,000-] 0.106 0.911 0.073 0.002
(0.473) (0.000)*** (0.62) (0.791)
Wealth
[200,000-499,999] -0.282 -0.835 -0.29 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.718)
[500,000-1,499,999] -0.039 -0.961 -0.053 0.018
(0.788) (0.000)*** (0.714) (0.058)*
Logit OLS
Continued on the next page
25Continued from the previous page
Year
1990 0.227 0.363 0.22 0.014
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
1995 -1.81 -2.394 -1.833 -0.047
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
2000 -1.857 -2.54 -1.89 -0.053
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
2004 -2.177 -2.919 -2.214 -0.062
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Spouse
Age
25-29 0.984 0.52 0.67 0.01
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
30-34 1.273 0.719 0.918 0.017
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
35-39 1.651 0.902 1.23 0.028
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
40-44 1.927 1.072 1.47 0.04
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
45-54 2.3 1.374 1.825 0.06
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
55- 3.087 2.056 2.59 0.11
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Education
High school 0.074 0.481 0.204 0.003
(0.074)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)**
< 3 years tertiary 0.216 0.615 0.34 0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
> 3 years tertiary 0.361 0.775 0.491 0.018
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Income
[122,000-199,999] 0.17 0.107 0.141 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.034)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
[200,000-299,999] 0.575 0.677 0.601 0.02
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
[300,000-499,999] 1.097 1.311 1.142 0.032
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
[500,000-] 2.11 2.403 2.162 0.091
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Continued on the next page
















High school -0.047 -0.003
(0.491) (0.062)*
< 3 years tertiary -0.118 -0.008
(0.148) (0.000)***
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< 3 years tertiary 0.004
(0.083)*













Constant -5.129 -5.517 -4.919 0.009
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***




0.141 0.141 0.146 0.041
Robust standard errors. p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
28